There is not a decisive signer or a more power signer in selecting and releasing keystones. Therefore, the situation of keystones switched by dishonest signers can be effectively avoided and the fairness of the MPCS scheme is also apparently improved. Our MPCS scheme is proved to be secure and can counteract the adaptive chosen message attack.
Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of electronic commerce [1] and electronic governance [2] affair nowadays, fair exchange turns out to be an increasingly important topic, such as ecommerce payment protocol, electronic contract signing protocol and certified e-mail delivery. In recent years, many fair exchange signature schemes (FESS) have been reported to make two individuals [3] or even two parties from different groups [4] exchange their signatures fairly. A third party is involved to judge a dispute in the FESS. Nevertheless, it is also an increasingly painful problem for three or more participants to exchange fairly their signatures or goods on a contract, since these participants may be dishonest to implement the contract.
There are mainly two different kinds of solutions to the problem of fair exchange signatures. One assumes that both parties have equivalent computation resources, and inefficient exchange signature "bit-by-bit" for many interactive rounds [5] [6] [7] . Nevertheless, these methods can't provide complete fairness, since one signer often has an advantage of one more bit than the other signer at the end of protocol. Therefore, these methods may be too interactive to apply widely. The other involves a TP, a TTP or an arbitrator to run or handle disputes between signers if necessary [8] [9] [10] [11] . However, these schemes may cause the bottleneck problem, since they require a dispute-resolving TTP, whose function is beyond the demands of a normal Certification Authority. L. Q. Chen et al introduced concurrent signatures to solve the problem of fair exchange signatures in 2004 [12] . The concurrent signature scheme having the ambiguity property of the ring signatures [13, 14] is a weaker version of two-party fair exchange without any third trusted party and many interactive exchange rounds. Such signature schemes allow two entities to produce and exchange two signatures, which are ambiguous until an extra piece of information, i.e., the keystone, is released by one of the parties. After the keystone is publicly known, the signer for each signature is identified and both signatures can instantly bind to their corresponding signers. W. Susilo et al pointed out that any third party can differentiate the real signer of a signature before the keystone is released when the initial signer Alice and the matching signer Bob are known to be honest players [15] and they extended concurrent signature to a stronger notion of perfect concurrent signature, which guarantees full ambiguity of the concurrent signature even if two entities are known to be trustworthy. G. L. Wang et al pointed out that there is an attack in the perfect concurrent signature schemes [16] . If the keystone releasing to Bob is prepared carefully by Alice, then Bob's signature can be bound while Alice's signature cannot. W. Susilo et al proposed a tripartite concurrent signature based on bilinear pairings [17] . However, it seems too complex to extend to the multi-party case. S. S. M. Chow et al proposed two ID-based perfect concurrent signature schemes based on two major paradigms of IDbased ring signature schemes [18] . Z. J. Huang et al pointed out that the two identity-based perfect concurrent signature schemes are unfair, since the initial signer could cheat the matching one [19] . K. Nguyen proposed asymmetric concurrent signature schemes based on Schnorr signature scheme and Schnorr-like signature scheme [20] . In 2010, J. W. Liu et al [21] proposed FESS, which have higher efficiency than concurrent signature schemes. However, FESS can not overcome the weakness of concurrent signature, i.e., the keystone is still controlled by the initial signer.
D. Tonien et al proposed a multi-party concurrent signature (MPCS) scheme with ring signatures and bilinear pairings in 2006 [22] . C. Shieh et al pointed out that the MPCS scheme proposed by Tonien et al did not achieve the goal of a concurrent signature [23] , and proposed a fair MPCS scheme providing a fairer property and flexibility in a transaction. Using bilinear parings, L. L. Wang constructed a MPCS scheme [24] , where the short ring signature is constructed based on dynamic accumulators. An MPCS scheme was presented by X. Tan et al [25] , where the concurrent signatures can be converted to ordinary signatures containing not any information of keystone to remain unlinkable when the keystone was released. L. Q. Chen et al noted that it will move closer to the full solution to the multi-party fair exchange problem if the MPCS scheme can be constructed and modeled correctly [12] . In fact, the MPCS scheme can also be constructed if we make use of the main technique called multi-designated verifiers [26] . Combining identity-based cryptographic system with the designated verifier, B. Y. Kang et al proposed an identitybased designated verifier signature scheme [27] , where the designated verifier signature can not be verified by any third party. Moreover, the designated verifier proofs are also proposed in [28] . The designated verifier signatures are only convinced by the intended recipient, who has a solely legal and designated public-key. However, D. Tonien et al noted that the construction from designated verifier proofs is not straightforward and it cannot achieve the required properties of concurrent signatures. Actually, F. Laguilaumie [26] noted that their scheme satisfies the properties of correctness, existential unforgeability against a chosen message attack, privacy of the signer's identity and source hiding. Moreover, it is not necessary for the secret information to be additionally encrypted and then be shared between the participants. Therefore, the participants have the same right to learn the secret information to ensure the fairness between the participants. Then a new MPCS scheme can be constructed effectively based on the above properties.
To ensure the fairness of MPCS scheme, a new model with keystones adopted in our two-party concurrent signature scheme [29] can be extended to the multi-user scenario. In the previous models, the initial signer has a decisive power or more power over the other users to select a single keystone. Motivated by this, we propose an MPCS scheme based on designated verifiers in this paper, in which all signers can select their own individual keystones to achieve the fairness. The binding of the signatures happens after one of the signers releases all their individual keystones. In the actual scenario, our MPCS scheme can be carried out over open networks and all signers do not need mutual trust. Once an initial signer implements this MPCS scheme, all signers have the same right to select themselves individual keystones and release all individual keystones to achieve the fairness of participation on a contract.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related basic concepts are described in section 2. The proposed multi-party concurrent signature scheme based on designated verifiers is introduced in section 3. The performances of our proposed scheme are analyzed in section 4. And a brief conclusion is reached in section 5. ( , ) e P Q for all
Ⅱ. BASIC CONCEPTS

A. Bilinear Pairings
A bilinear pairing instance generator is defined as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm Λ that takes a security parameter l as input and returns a uniformly random tuple parameter 1 2 ( , , , , ) q P G G e of bilinear parameters, including a prime number q of size l , a generator P of 1 G .
B. CBDH Assumption
Given ( , , , ) P xP yP zP for some , , [30] .
Ⅲ. MULTI-PARTY CONCURRENT SIGNATURE SCHEME BASED ON DESIGNATED VERIFIERS Our construction is inspired by the jobs in [17, 26] . In our MPCS scheme, n participants are bound with the security parameter l . The outputs of the procedures such as Setup, Keystone Generation and ASign are probabilistic. However, the procedures including Extraction, AVerify and BindingVerify have the deterministic outputs. Our MPCS scheme works as follows:
(1) Setup: On inputting a security parameter l , descriptions of the set of the participants U , the message space M , the signature space S , the keystone space K , the encrypted keystone F , and a hash function 
The Setup algorithm also outputs the public parameters, together with all public keys 
The signer gets
ASign algorithm also selects an ' j q r Z * ∈ at random and
. Hence, the signer sends the signature to the only designated verifiers (the other participants). with an overwhelming probability. If so, j verifies whether ( , )
j j e C P is equal to
or not. The probability for any attackers to solve the CDH problem successfully is almost negligible under the complexity assumptions. Hence the other participants can successfully check the signature with an overwhelming probability. Further, once their own individual keystones are released by one of the signers, the outsiders can easily check the validity of keystones by
, and the outsiders can further check the signatures of correctness by the AVerify algorithms and the BindingVerify algorithm. Then the correctness of our signature scheme is deduced as follows:
' P ( ) (1) Public key: The adversary is given the public tuple
(2) Hash queries: At anytime, the adversary can ask a hash value for any input. For each hash function, we will maintain a hash list so that the hash outputs could be consistent. 
Therefore, if there is a non-negligible probability to generate the forgeable signature by the above game between the adversary and the challenger, then it will lead to a successful solution to the CDH problem.
C. Ambiguity
Theorem 3 Our MPCS scheme is ambiguous and any outsiders couldn't determine the real signer until all individual keystones are released.
Proof 
D. Fairness
Theorem 4 Our MPCS scheme is fairness, since no matching signer left in a position where an individual keystone binds his signature to him while some of other signers' signatures are not bound to them after all participants released their own individual keystones.
Proof. If all signers are secure to implement the MPCS scheme, then one of the signers can get all their own individual keystones with the Extracting algorithm. If the MPCS scheme is unfair, by definition it must violate one of these two conditions with a non-negligible probability:
Case 1: One signer j can obtain a valid signature such Then he/she can easily generate a forgery signature by the MPCS scheme. This implies an MPCS forgery, which contradicts the unforgeability of our MPCS scheme. Hence, the probability of the forgery signature is negligible due to the unforgeability. e K k e C P = , then the signer j won't be left in an alone position. Therefore, our MPCS scheme satisfies the property of fairness. In addition, the inherent unfairness of the previous concurrent signature schemes [12, 17, 18, 22] can be further avoided by adding a timestamp, if an initial signer doesn't release all individual keystones after n signatures verified successfully for a long time. Once the time of releasing all keystones exceeds the limit, then the other signers have the same right to release the individual keystones instead of the initial signer, or to abandon the implementation of this MPCS scheme.
E. Security
Theorem 5 Under the hardness of CDH problem, our MPCS scheme is secure in the random oracle model.
A secure MPCS scheme should satisfy the properties of correctness, unforgeability, ambiguity and fairness. Intuitively, our MPCS scheme satisfies the four properties, and the proof has been given from Theorem 1 to 4. Hence, our MPCS scheme is secure since CDH problem is hard to solve in the random oracle model.
F. Performance comparison
As for the computational overheads, we only consider bilinear mappings (denoted by P ), multi-exponentiation on 2 G (denoted by E ) and hash operation (denoted by H ). The efficiencies of our MPCS scheme and Tonien's MPCS scheme are compiled in Table. 1. From Table. 1, our scheme uses less cost in the generation period of signature, and there aren't any bilinear and multiexponentiation operations in the ASign algorithm. The complexity of our MPCS scheme is reduced apparently and more efficient than that of Tonien's MPCS scheme. Even if the length of our MPCS scheme is longer than Tonien's scheme, our scheme is better than Tonien's scheme due to the advantages in the ASIGN algorithm. 
Ⅴ. CONCLUSIONS
A new MPCS scheme based on multi-designated verifiers is proposed. Unlike the previous schemes where the keystones are only released by the initial signer, all signers in our scheme have the same power to release all individual keystones once the time of releasing the individual keystones exceeds the limits. The efficiency and fairness of the MPCS scheme is improved further. The MPCS algorithm has a good scalability since it can be easily used not only between two signers but also among three or more signers. In other words, the scenarios of the concurrent signature can be easily applied from two-party to multi-party and vice versa, where the security assumption can be proved in the same way. The length of our signature scheme is linear with the increment of participants since the MPCS scheme is based on the concept of ring signature.
